I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2007, then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf declared a state of emergency, suspended the Constitution and summarily dismissed the Chief Justice and other members of the High Court.
1 Images of middle-class lawyers in court attire clashing with police were broadcast around the world. In the campaign for parliamentary elections held in February 2008, the two leading opposition parties pledged to restore the independence of the judiciary. For the opposition, hitching their political wagon to the independence of judiciary was a highly successful political strategy which contributed to their overwhelming victory. However, after they formed the government, the two parties quickly began to bicker over the details of restoring the deposed judges, leading to a political stalemate.
The Pakistani experience is instructive because of the transparency with which judicial independence was used for political purposes. In less overt instances, governments in common law countries have long turned to judges to address some of the most vexing and controversial public policy issues of the day. Commissions of inquiry are the most obvious example. In the United States, Chief Justice Earl Warren headed the Commission which bore his name investigating the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. In South Africa, President F.W. de Klerk and ANC leader Nelson Mandela tapped Justice Richard Goldstone 2 to head an inquiry into allegations of state-sponsored violence that threatened to destabilize that country's democratic transition. In Israel, judges have headed commissions inquiring into intelligence failures of the Yom Kippur War, the massacres at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Lebanon in 1982 and most recently into Israel's prosecution of the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Public inquiries have a strong pedigree in the United Kingdom as well.
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3 conception of that term. The current political culture of independence and accountability has made judicial independence a highly valued political commodity that is frequently in demand by government officials. This chapter will argue that what public policy makers are seeking is not simply the expertise of judges but also the political capital of judicial independence which has become an increasingly valued political good in Canadian society (and likely in others as well).
In Canada we increasingly value independence from political decision making.
7 This paper analyzes and evaluates this trend from the perspective of judicial independence. While I acknowledge that the use of judges for public policy purposes certainly has distinct benefits that have been well chronicled by others, my thesis is that this phenomenon also has the potential to undermine the bedrock principle of judicial independence if it is not better managed by the judiciary in concert with the executive. I begin therefore by examining the nature and purpose of judicial independence. I then describe the judicialization of politics noted above before analyzing two cautionary tales from the use of judicial independence for public policy purposes: the Gomery Inquiry and the controversy over the Chief Justice's involvement in the award of the Order of Canada to abortion activist Dr. Henry Morgentaler. Finally, this paper ends with the argument that taking judicial independence seriously necessitates that judges develop a framework for the consideration of extra-judicial functions and begin to exercise greater discretion in refusing to take on executive functions at times, lest the political currency of judicial independence become devalued over time.
II. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

A. THE INSTRUMENTAL CHARACTER OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a highly valued constitutional norm around the world. 8 In Canada, it has been elevated to the status of an unwritten constitutional principle 9 that has equal 4CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL. 05NO.02 if not stronger force than some of the textual provisions of Canada's Constitution. 10 However, as Peter Russell explains in his contribution to this book, there has been a lack of agreement about what judicial independence encompasses. 11 Russell's theoretical framework attempts to isolate and describe the elusive "it" that is judicial independence. In this chapter, I focus largely on judicial statements in order to set out the nature and purpose of judicial independence against which I evaluate its use as a policy good outside of the adjudication process in the sections that follow.
In Canada and around the world it is widely acknowledged that judicial independence is not an end in itself. Judicial independence, it is claimed, serves various other social and political objectives. 12 As Chief Justice Lamer asserted in the Provincial Judges Reference, "judicial independence . . . is not an end it itself… [it] is valued because it serves important societal goals -it is a means to secure those goals." 13 As Peter Russell has argued, " [t] hose who believe that some measure of judicial independence is desirable must hold this belief, because judicial independence is thought to serve some important objective, to contribute to some desirable state August -7 September, 1990 (A/Conf.144/190) Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice) , [1997] This instrumental view of judicial independence predominates in the literature 15 and the jurisprudence although it is often lost in the heated rhetoric that arises when there are purported threats to judicial independence. Frequently in such cases, defenders against such perceived incursions fail to articulate the nature of the threat to judicial independence let alone how the threat undermines the relevant first order values that judicial independence is intended to protect.
16
Judicial independence is regularly invoked as a shield against changes to judicial structure or benefits. However, such invocations of the shibboleth of judicial independence often overlook or ignore the idea that judicial independence is not an end it itself and certainly its purpose is not to protect judicial privileges. 17 To better understand the nature and purpose of judicial independence it is necessary to hone in on the arguments for it.
14 Peter H. Russell, "Towards a General Theory of Judicial Independence", ibid. at 2. In this volume see e.g. the contributions of Sonia Lawrence ("judicial independence is not a 'goal in itself,' but rather a means to impartiality and legitimacy, so that links between diversity and legitimacy and impartiality might not explicitly mention judicial independence despite a clear connection.") (manuscript at 2); Rosemary Cairns Way ("The [Social Context Education Project] aimed to engaged that conceptualization directly by challenging participants to understand independence purposively as an essential means of protecting and fostering the core obligation of impartiality") (manuscript at 24), Patricia Hughes ("It is trite to say, but always worth remembering, that judicial independence is not an end in itself; rather, it is crucial to the rule of law and the ability of judges to be impartial.") (manuscript at 7). 16 For example, in 2007 the Canadian Judicial Council and the bar vigorously opposed plans by the federal Minister of Justice to change the composition of the judicial advisory committees that vet candidates for federal judicial appointments but failed to convincingly articulate how such changes could threaten any of the values that the independence of the judiciary is intended to protect. See Tonda MacCharles, "Tories imperil neutral courts: Judges; Plans for advisory committees risk politicizing system, council argues" The Toronto Star (21 February 2007) 
B. INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY INTERTWINED
Most arguments for judicial independence are based on the critical connection between it and judicial impartiality. The customary case for judicial independence is composed of several interconnected strands. First, judicial independence is required to ensure judicial impartiality. Second, this impartiality in turn promotes public confidence in the impartial adjudication of disputes which secures the legitimacy of the legal system. Finally, such confidence and legitimacy upholds the Rule of Law, although at times it is asserted that judicial independence itself directly serves these functions. 18 Let me attempt to unpack this by explaining the nexus and the distinction between judicial independence and judicial impartiality. The two concepts are closely linked and are often asserted in tandem: "[i]ndependent and impartial adjudication is essential to a free and democratic society."
19 However, the twin ideas of independence and impartiality are distinct.
In Valente (1985) , Justice Le Dain distinguished between the two concepts. He explained that "impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relations to the issues and the parties in a particular case."
20 Independence, on the other hand, refers to the "status or relationship to others, particularly to the executive branch of government, that rests on objective conditions or guarantees." 21 It is asserted that independence is necessary in order to promote and protect impartiality. As Chief Justice Lamer explained in Lippé (1991), "[j]udicial independence is critical to the public's perception of impartiality. Independence is the cornerstone, a necessary prerequisite, for judicial impartiality."
22 Along similar lines, the Canadian Judicial Council has explained that "[j]udicial independence is not the private right of judges but the foundation of judicial impartiality and a constitutional right of all Canadians. Independence of the judiciary refers to the necessary individual and collective or institutional independence required for impartial decisions and decision making."
23 Judicial independence is derivative of impartiality and a protective shield to ensure it.
Within each instrumental thread of judicial independence we can see how the concept is tied to the adjudication of disputes, the defining characteristic of the judicial function. 24 This is an obvious but important point and other functions that judges perform are subsidiary to this core function. The Supreme Court made this explicit link to adjudication when it stated that the independence of individual judges is necessary to ensure "the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that come before them".
25
Judicial independence is clearly linked to the impartial adjudication of disputes; impartiality is the sine qua non of adjudication. When judges are engaged in activities outside of adjudication ("extrajudicial activities"), the premise for their independence -impartiality in dispute adjudication --is removed. 26 While new arguments for the independence of judges engaged in extra-judicial activities may exist, they need to be constructed and proffered as they cannot be based on the adjudicatory functions. There are different types of extra-judicial activities and each requires examination through the lens of judicial independence. In the next section I analyze several types of extra-judicial activities and explain how judicial independence is used instrumentally outside of the core adjudicatory function of the judiciary.
III. THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS A PUBLIC POLICY INSTRUMENT
A. THE RISE OF THE JUDGES
The judiciary in Canada and in most countries is established as a separate branch of government and this idea of separation of powers is an important feature of judicial independence. When judges act outside of their constitutionally mandated judicial role, questions exist regarding the separation of powers and the appropriateness of judges acting in what, strictly speaking, are non-judicial capacities. While the judiciary has acknowledged the 24 See Fraser v. Public Service Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455 at 469-70 (per Dickson C.J.) (explaining that in broad terms, "the role of the judiciary is…to interpret and apply the law; the role of the legislature is to decide upon and enunciate policy; the role if the executive is to administer and implement that policy."). 25 Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 9 at para. 123 quoting Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at 69. See also Provincial Judges Reference, ibid. at para. 10 ("One of these goals is the maintenance of public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary which is essential to the effectiveness of the court system. Independence contributes to the perception that justice will be done in individual cases."). existence of potential problems, 27 serious scrutiny has yet to be undertaken. Extra-judicial activities are not wholly without their potential costs. At this point, I wish to raise some theoretical issues with the use of judges for public policy purposes.
Governments have frequently sought the assistance of judges for public policy purposes. The first conceptual problem arises because of the separation of powers. When judges are engaged in public policy activities for the executive, they are performing executive functions and their mandates are wholly creatures of the executive. 28 For the most part, the motives of governments have been pure as they sought assistance from members of the judiciary to advise on particular problems. However, at some level, there is a political component to the use of judges by the executive that may be more or less apparent, depending on the circumstances.
On this political level, judicial independence may be used by governments for purposes that are not connected to the core of the principle. Unmoored from its constitutional foundation of the adjudication of disputes, judicial independence may be used for other political ends, namely to deflect attention from the executive branch of government and to provide greater credibility for both the process and the outcome of various non-judicial endeavours. Judges may be used to give the whole process an "aura of independence" so that "the government-established investigation gains the appearance of independence with a federal judge at the helm."
29 In sum, judicial independence has become a valued political currency in Canada.
As a result of protections developed over time, one of the world's strongest independent judiciaries has arisen in Canada. The character of judicial independence in Canada has enabled the executive branch of government, with the acquiescence of the judiciary, to use judicial independence for other functions that are wholly unconnected to its purposes. Peter Russell has been at the forefront of recognizing and explaining the unique nature of the exercises of judicial power and the issues that arise with it. 30 Other scholars followed in describing a "judicialization of politics". Michael Mandel has written about the "legalization of politics", 31 
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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS A PUBLIC POLICY INSTRUMENT 9 the rise of a "juristocracy" 32 and Robert Bork of the "worldwide rule of judges". 33 Each has in common the assertion of an increase in judicial power through the transfer of disputes from the political realm to the judicial. 34 The phenomenon that I am describing is different. It is the purposeful temporary deployment of judges by the executive for decidedly non-judicial functions. This calculated government "rent-a-judge" 35 strategy is explicitly intended to address public policy issues. It does not involve using judges qua judges to adjudicate political disputes to a certain political end, as Mandel, Hirschl, Bork and others describe. Rather, it involves the use of judges by the executive in order to address public policy issues in order to enhance the process or outcome with the trappings of judicial office and of judicial independence. The executive branch draws upon the political capital of judicial independence aware that "the knowledge that a judge is presiding over a public inquiry will add to the public perception that the independence that judges enjoy will be imported into the inquiry context." 36 The executive branch relies both on the public's inability to distinguish between judges acting in judicial and extra-judicial capacities and the judiciary's acquiescence to this arrangement. This use of judicial independence is especially important for fact-finding inquiries but is also useful for controversial policy inquiries.
37
Recent years have witnessed a significant increase in the use of judges by the executive to address a plethora of public policy issues. What is notable is not only the resurgence of the popularity of public inquiries after a lull of a decade or so but also the expansion of the use of 34 Mandel argues that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has led to a "legalization of politics" in the sense of a transfer of policy making from the political to the legal sphere with concomitant anti-progressive results. Mandel, supra note 31. Looking at the phenomenon on a global scale, Hirschl asserts that constitutional reform has transferred power from representative institutions to courts. He contends that the constitutionalization process is the result of a strategic interplay among hegemonic yet threatened political elites, economic stakeholders and judicial leaders in order to lock in political gains and insulate them from democratic politics. Hirschl, supra note 32. Robert Bork sees the same phenomenon as Mandel and Hirschl but draws opposite conclusions. He argues that around the world judicial activism has resulted in the judicialization of politics and morals with courts around the world siding with left-wing political causes in the international culture wars. Bork, ibid. 35 To be clear, a sitting judge receives no additional remuneration for agreeing to serve on a commission of inquiry. See Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1, s. 57. The cost of the salary of the judge-commissioner is relatively minor in comparison to the other costs associated with a commission of inquiry. Reappraise (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) 361 at 367 (noting that there is "great confusion" between the typical principles of judicial independence and those that apply when a judge sits on a public inquiry). 37 On the distinction between "fact finding" and "policy" inquiries see O'Connor & Kristjanson, supra note 5 at 4-6. The current trend is to combine both fact-finding and policy inquiries or to append a policy component onto what is essential a fact-finding inquiry. This was the case in the Gomery Inquiry and the Mulroney-Schreiber Inquiry. 10CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL.05NO.02 judges for many public policy exercises on an ad hoc basis. Of further significance is the acquiescence if not the implied support by the judiciary for such extra-judicial activities. The phenomenon is a national one but in addition to the federal scene, I focus on Ontario as the province with which I am most familiar. I turn first to the revival of judge-led public inquiries.
B. THE RESURGENCE OF PUBLIC INQUIRIES
Recent years have witnessed a renaissance in the popularity of public inquiries almost invariably headed by judges, often active ones. In Canada, public inquiries have a long pedigree that pre-dates Confederation in 1867. 38 They have been termed "a quintessential Canadian policy device", 39 "a time-honoured institutional mechanism for the formulation of public policy in Canada", 40 "a particularly Canadian disease", 41 and have played an important role in Canadian political history. 42 However, until recently, they appeared to be headed for the endangered political species list. A decade ago, commentators were lamenting the apparent demise of public inquiries;
43 they seemed to have fallen into disuse due to neglect or animus by political leaders, both federal and provincial. (asserting that federal public inquiries "have marked, if not inspired, some of the pivotal moments in Canada's modern history…They have focused public attention in ways seldom achieved through the normal political process. They have been used consciously to mould public opinion, and they have profoundly influenced the course of public policy and the standards of public life."). However, in retrospect, many public inquiries are more a matter of political expediency than enduring policy or public value. See ibid. at 89 (noting that the Trudeau-Mulroney years were marked by many policy inquiries but few important ones). 51 These only cover the federally-appointed inquiries; as discussed below, several provincial inquiries were ongoing during the same period. Thus, it is only half-jokingly that one Canadian Senator quipped that working in Ottawa, "we have elections, budgets, Throne Speeches-just to fill the time between inquiries." 
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counterpart an antipathy towards public inquiries. For the duration of its two terms in government, the Harris Government resisted calls for an inquiry into the 1995 shooting death of Native protester Dudley George at Ipperwash Park. However, when seven people died and over 2,300 became sick from e-coli in the Town of Walkerton's drinking water, Premier Harris appointed Associate Chief Justice Dennis O'Connor to head a public inquiry. Justice O'Connor's administration of the public inquiry was widely praised and it quickly became the gold standard against which future public inquiries were to be measured. 53 It also became an idealized model of a public inquiry: a strong and compassionate judge running an effective public inquiry and delivering a relevant report within a reasonable period of time on a subject that could not be considered "inside politics" or inherently partisan. 54 At the end of the mandate of Harris's successor, Premier Ernie Eves, another public health crisis of international proportions, SARS, led to the appointment of Justice Archie Campbell to head a commission of inquiry on that subject.
55
For eight years, Ontario's provincial Liberal opposition had called for a public inquiry into the death of Dudley George and promised in its 2003 election platform to convene one. After it was elected in October 2003, one of the first acts of the new Liberal government in Ontario was to appoint the former Chief Justice of Ontario's provincial court, the Honourable Sidney Linden, to head a public inquiry into events at Ipperwash and he was given a broad mandate to also make recommendations regarding avoiding violence in similar circumstances.
56
The Ontario Liberals followed soon after with the appointment of Justice Roland Haines to conduct a review of Ontario's meat inspection system. 57 The Meat Review was then followed by a full-fledged public inquiry into allegations of sexual abuse in Cornwall, Ontario 58 and the 53 See Janice Tibbetts, "Judges' roles in probes debated" The National Post (3 November 2008). 54 This inquiry had a partisan political element in that various political parties sought standing to argue that budget cuts made by a particular political party in power were more responsible for lax regulation than budget cuts made during their tenure in power. . In each of these cases, federal and provincial, the public inquiry was or is being headed by a judge. Amidst all of this, Quebec stands as an outlier; not in its resistance to public inquiries but in its willingness to hold public inquiries headed by non-judges.
71
There is a certain paradox in using judges to head public inquiries. On a separation of powers level, inquiries are instruments of the executive, yet they are most frequently headed by judges.
72 Often public inquiries are called "to remove an unpleasant controversy from the political agenda."
73
It is generally recognized that there is a potential risk at least to the individual judges who decide to head up a public inquiry. Canadian constitutional scholar MacGregor Dawson explained this well in 1957 when he cautioned:
There would seem to be little purpose in taking elaborate care to separate the judge from politics and to render him quite independent of the executive, and then placing him in a position as a Royal Commissioner where his impartiality may be attacked and his findings -no matter how correct and judicial they may be -are liable to be interpreted as favouring one political party at the expense of the other. For many of the inquiries 
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15 or boards place the judge in a position where he cannot escape controversy: . . .
74
Professor Dawson's warnings ring true today, over a half century after he wrote these words. There is a real risk of judicial entanglement in highly political disputes when judges agree to participate in public inquiries. In the United States, this recognition has led to an established bar and bench to view judicial involvement in public inquiries as improper judicial conduct. 75 In Australia, the propriety of such judicial involvement is strongly contested, with some even asserting that it is unconstitutional.
76 Canada takes a different approach. While the federal Judges Act generally prohibits extra-judicial activities, it allows them if they are expressly authorized by legislation of the relevant federal or provincial legislature. 77 To date, Canadian judges and lawyers have not seriously addressed the separation of powers concerns that have animated debates in other jurisdictions.
78
The Canadian Judicial Council -the body statutorily charged with overseeing the conduct of Canada's federally appointed judges -acknowledged the issue over a decade ago. In 1998, it recognized the possible pitfalls of judges sitting on public inquiries in its ethical guidelines for judges, stating that when judges are considering a request to serve as inquiry commissioners, they "should think carefully about the implications for judicial independence of 74 MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, 3 rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957) 482. Dawson further stated that "It has been proved time and again that it many of these cases the judge loses in dignity and reputation, and his future is appreciably lessened thereby. Moreover, if the judge remains away from his regular duties for very long periods, he is apt to lose his sense of balance and detachment; and he finds that the task of getting back to normal and of adjusting his outlook and habits of mind to purely judicial work is by no means easy." Ibid. These passages from Dawson are quoted with approval by the Canadian Judicial council in its Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1998) ch. 4 (Judicial Independence), cmt. 8, n. 9. Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Foundation, 1985) 43. A Committee of the CBA recommended that generally judges should not be asked to participate in commissions of inquiry except where "the nature of the matter under investigation makes the choice of a judge as a commissioner of inquiry particularly appropriate." Ibid. at 59. This CBA Committee seemed to be recommending that the default rule be that a judge not participate in a commission of inquiry. This discussion was part of a broader report on the independence of the judiciary undertaken in the context of proposed statutory and constitutional reforms which did not come to fruition. 16CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL.05NO.02 accepting the appointment." 79 The Canadian Judicial Council noted that there were examples of "Judicial Commissioners becoming embroiled in public controversy and being criticized and embarrassed by the very governments that appointed them." The guideline concluded by recommending that the terms of reference and other conditions "should be examined carefully so as to assess their compatibility with the judicial function." 80 This is good advice, but there is little indication that it has been followed. Moreover, the guidelines also indicate that individual judges who are approached to serve as commissioners should consult with their chief justices. This indicates that the decision to serve as a commissioner has both an individual and an institutional component and that both elements should be considered in a decision by a particular judge to serve as a commissioner.
The guidelines referred to above were the result of a resolution adopted by the Canadian Judicial Council in March 1998 entitled "Position of the Canadian Judicial Council on the Appointment of Federally-Appointed Judges to Commissions of Inquiry" which provided more specific guidance on this issue. 81 This statement had a number of relevant components: (1) every request for a judge to take on an extra-judicial function should be made in first instance to the chief justice of the relevant court; (2) such request should be accompanied by a reference to the statutory authority for the proposed appointment; (3) the request be accompanied with the proposed terms of reference for the inquiry and indication of the time limit for it; (4) sufficient time be given for the chief justice to discuss fully the request with the relevant judge whose services are requested; (5) the chief justice, in consultation with the judge in question, should consider whether the judge's absence would significantly impair the work of the court; and (6) the chief justice and the judge should consider whether accepting the proposed appointment could impair the future work of the judge as a member of the court.
82 In particular, they should consider:
• Whether the subject-matter of the inquiry essentially requires advice on public policy or involves issues of an essentially partisan nature; • Whether it essentially involves an investigation into the conduct of agencies of the appointing government; • Whether the inquiry is essentially an investigation of whether particular individuals have committed a crime or a civil wrong; • Who is to select commission counsel and staff;
• Whether the proposed judge is specially required for this inquiry, through particular knowledge or experience, or whether a retired or supernumerary judge would be suitable; and After the Canadian Judicial Council's statement was adopted, Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, as head of the Council, sent a memorandum to all First Ministers expressing concerns about the use of federally-appointed judges as commissioners in public inquiries on both independence and operational grounds and attaching the statement.
The Canadian Judicial Council's actions in 1998 were an excellent recognition of the problems associated with extra-judicial activities of judges. However, the actions of the Canadian Judicial Council and the Chief Justice in 1998 coincided with what turned out to be a period of hiatus in public inquiries and the warnings seemed to have disappeared into the wind. As discussed above, this was a period during which the leaders of the two largest governments in Canada expressed a strong antipathy towards public inquiries. 84 As discussed in the next section, there is good reason to revisit Chief Justice Lamer's memorandum and the Canadian Judicial Council's guidelines and take their warnings seriously.
Moreover, the Canadian Judicial Council's guidelines give the misleading impression that public inquiries are set up through a careful process of deliberation and consultation. While this may be the case, it rarely is so. 85 More often than not, public inquiries are established under the heat of political pressure and the selection of the judge becomes a matter of political urgency 83 Ibid. 84 In his memoirs, former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien explained at length: "For the opposition parties, calling for a public inquiry is usually an easy way to dig up dirt or keep a hot issue on the front burner after they've exhausted their own supply of facts and questions. For the government, giving in to the calls is often a mechanism to do nothing, to dodge responsibility, or to postpone a controversial decision until after the next election. Very few of these inquiries in my experience have ever been of much use, and those few were valuable only because they didn't turn into television soap operas. If there's a problem, you should face up to it and make a decision. If you need more information, you can always ask the department to give you a full report. If you need an independence point of view, you can ask someone to carry out an investigation without a lot of fanfare, as happened when I asked Robert Nixon, a former Treasurer of Ontario, to look into the circumstances around the Tories' deal to privatize Toronto's Pearson International Airport, which had been an issue in the 1995 election campaign. If you want to examine a broad social issue, you can set up a royal commission, as we did with health. But it is in the nature of public inquiries to get turned into show trials, kangaroo courts, and political entertainment. The rules of evidence don't have to be respected as they are in a court. There's not the same right of due process or even the same process to protect the innocent during the investigation into a possible wrong-doing. Scores of reputations are shattered for not good cause; people lose their jobs merely because their names happened to be mentioned in passing; and the entire public service is tarred by gossip and innuendo. J. No. 973, 2008 FC 802 [Chrétien v. Canada] . However, Mr. Chrétien's pattern of resistance towards public inquiries during the course of his prime ministership (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) lends credence to his assertions above. 85 See d'Ombrain, supra note 5 at 93 (stating that most investigative commissions of inquiry are set up very quickly, usually in response to intolerable political pressure and are invariably headed by judges). 18CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL. 05NO.02 and expediency rather than a policy ideal. 86 Since the Canadian Judicial Council's statement was issued over a decade ago, there has been no publicly acknowledged instance of either a provincial or federal government being unable to obtain the necessary approvals in order to get a federally-appointed judge to head a commission of inquiry. While certainly it is likely the case that chief justices have been unwilling to release particular judges due to judicial workload and that individual judges have turned down governments' requests to head a public inquiry, there always appears to be a judge willing to take on the task with the approval of his or her chief justice. At the end of the day, that is usually what governments are seeking: a generic judge that can then be used by governments in order to attach the label "independent" to the inquiry being established. In fact, this is how the calling of most public inquiries work in practice. First, the government announces its intention to call a public inquiry which is often referred to as "a judicial inquiry"; subsequently, they announce the name of the judge and the terms of reference. In most cases, the judge is unknown to the public and to the press and information about who that person is comes out later; who they are is secondary to what they are -a judge who carries the political capital of judicial independence that immediately gives the process credibility as "independent". 87 Despite the obvious pitfalls for judges and for the judiciary in heading public inquiries, extrajudicial functions of judges have continued to expand in Canada over the past decade as discussed in the next section.
C. BEYOND PUBLIC INQUIRIES: JUDGES FOR EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
There is a long history in Canada of assigning judges to extra-judicial functions beyond the realm of public inquiries The most notable such responsibility is the appointment of the Chief Justice of Canada as Deputy Governor General, or in the case of the absence or unavailability of the Chief Justice, the most senior available puisne justice. This appointment was formalized in the 1947 Letters Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor General of Canada. 88 The Governor General exercises both legislative powers (the granting of royal assent for all legislation) as well as executive ones (e.g. selection of the Prime Minister, prorogation, the dissolution of Parliament). Her role is largely ceremonial and the powers that she exercises are almost exclusively based on the advice of her ministers, notably the Prime Minister. However, in critical constitutional situations such as the one that Canada faced in late 2008, the 86 See ibid. ("The decisions about these inquiries and selection of commissioners is often made in a disorderly way."). 
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19 Governor General is called upon to exercise her independent discretion as to how to act. 89 And if she were unavailable or out of the country, the Chief Justice (or another Supreme Court justice) would exercise such decidedly non-judicial powers. 90 The provinces have followed this model with their Chief Justices filling the Lieutenant-Governor's role in case of absence or unavailability.
Similarly, judges have long headed electoral boundary commissions in Canada. This function is not a new one and unlike public inquiries, the mandate, duration and operation of such commissions follow a general and predictable format. 91 Because of their direct link to electoral politics, electoral boundary commissions are transparently political and the opportunities for political involvement are established and predictable: testimony during such commissions and the legislature's response after the commissions deliver their report. Recent scrapes between the government and electoral commission in British Columbia, highlight the political stakes in the process.
92
In recent years, there has been a significant expansion of the use of judges, retired and active, for both administrative and executive functions. Especially notable is the dramatic expansion of judges for public policy roles outside of public inquiries. This judicialization of the policy and administrative spheres is a function of both supply and demand. On the supply side, a larger pool of former federally-appointed judges has developed due to early and active retirements. 93 The nature of judicial retirement has changed, as has the character of retirement generally in society. The old model of the retired judge was of the eminence grise who perhaps joined a law firm and dispensed wise counsel to younger lawyers or gave after dinner speeches at bar association functions. The new model of judicial retirement is of an active second career, either back at the bar or in the realm of public policy.
On the demand side, there are a number of reasons why such judges are especially popular choices for governments. The demand for actors outside of government such as judges to conduct both targeted and general policy reviews has increased as the supply of other possible 90 At the least it is notable that there has been no serious discussion as to the propriety of the Chief Justice (or a puisne judge) exercising such non-judicial functions, on separation of powers and other grounds. candidates to conduct such reviews has declined over time. Across Canada, the independent policy making capacity of non-governmental actors was dealt a heavy blow in the last decade of the last century and the first decade of this century. Federal and provincial governments disbanded law commissions and reduced funding to other arm's length organizations that produced policy work. Canada has never had the same level of strong independent public policy think tanks as in the United States. Canada has good public policy institutes, but no equivalents to the Rand Corporation, the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institute or the Pew Research Center which have exerted a strong influence on the formation of American policy. 94 Political parties have very limited research and policy capabilities 95 and the internal policymaking capacities of governments were weakened during government cutbacks in the 1990s. At the same time, governments have been unwilling to use legislative tools such as committees of the Legislature in order to engage in investigative or policy-making functions, due in part to the decline in public perceptions of our elected officials. 96 In sum, in Canada, the public policy capacities both inside and outside government are limited or have weakened and a strong negative perception exists regarding government's ability to address an issue whenever a specific problem arises. Government institutions have weakened in favour of the rise of a cadre of "independent" officials and bodies and the use of judges for such activities falls within this category.
In the realm of administrative functions, retired judges are favored for new positions that have been created across the country such as parliamentary ethics or integrity officers, 97 and
IV. CAUTIONARY TALES FROM THE USE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY PURPOSES
In the previous section, I discussed some general reasons for the use of judges outside their traditional adjudicative role and some of the problems that may arise in this context. In this section, I use two case studies, one involving a public inquiry and one involving another type of extra-judicial function, to demonstrate how judicial independence can be damaged through such extra-judicial activities.
A. THE SPONSORSHIP INQUIRY
While only several years old, the Sponsorship Inquiry headed by Quebec Superior Court Justice John Gomery has quickly become a textbook case study in how a judge should not run a public inquiry. More interesting than Judge Gomery's personal actions however, is the question whether the Gomery Inquiry represents an example of a public policy area in which judges should not tread at all. The Sponsorship Scandal was not qualitatively or quantitatively different from other political scandals that have beset Canadian governments -Liberal and Conservativeover the past decades. It was triggered by the report of the Auditor General of Canada into the misuse of government funds for advertising on sponsorship activities in Quebec after the near death experience of the Quebec Referendum of 1995. In the face of scandals of a certain magnitude it becomes routine for the opposition to call for "a full public inquiry" into the scandal. Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien successfully avoided such attacks on a number of files: Shawiniganate, Air India and the Human Resources Development Corporation (HRDC) (aka "the Billion Dollar Boondoogle"). The decision to call a public inquiry into the sponsorship scandal was a conscious political choice made by a new Prime Minister, Paul Martin, eager to distinguish his administration from the politics of his predecessor. Ultimately, the public inquiry contributed to the fall of Martin's Liberal government in January 2006 and the return to power of the Conservatives led by Stephen Harper.
The decision to call a public inquiry into the Sponsorship Scandal was a transparent attempt by a new government to use the trappings of judicial office in the attempt to cleanse the taint of political scandal. This decision is widely acknowledged to have been a political miscalculation of monumental proportions. 111 Not only was the Gomery Inquiry a political
